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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
obligor resides."8 Such an election provides the wife with a forum-shop-
ping opportunity. To combat this result, the Act was amended in 1952
to provide that the only applicable law is that of the state where the
pbligor was present during the period for which support is sought."0 The
amended version, while destroying the opportunity of the wife to forum
shop, allows the husband to shop for a favorable state in which to reside.
The states operating under this amended version and at the same time
affording a spouse no survival of support"0 face a dilemma. If they fol-
low the Act and revert to the support law of their jurisdiction, the wife
has no right to survival of support-their own laws terminate it. In
such a situation, they may resort to the normal conflicts rule and find that
the wife is afforded the right of survival under the law of her domicile.
But what if the laws of her domicile likewise terminate her right to sur-
vival? The wife may then find herself without a remedy, and once again
matrimonial law is found in its familiar state of frustration. In order
to solve this problem, it would be beneficial if the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recommended legislation to in-
sure uniform survival of support in the form of an amendment to the
URESA.
Since the present language of the URESA affords the husband an op-
portunity to forum shop, the Commissioners would also do well to
amend section seven to give the courts-not the obligee-the power of
election in order that they may exercise discretion in applying either
the law of the jurisdiction where the obligee resided when the failure
of support commenced or the law of their own jurisdiction."1
JOSEPia E. ELROD III
Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure-The Permissible Scope
of a Frisk
Antagonism between the police and the judiciary is perhaps an
inevitable outcome ... of the different interests residing in the police
as a specialized agency and the judiciary as a representative of wider
community interests. Constitutional guarantees of due process of
law do make the working life and conditions of the police more diffi-
" R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-11-13 (1956). See note 54 supra.
" For a list of the states which adopted the 1952 amendment see 9C UNIFORM
LAws ANN. (Supp. 1967).
o See note 31 supra.
1This solution has been suggested previously. See Note, 44 TEXAs L. REv.
814, 818-19 (1966).
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cult. But if such guarantees did not exist, the police would of course
engage in activities promoting self-serving ends, as does any agency
when offered such freedom in a situation of conflicting goals. Every
administrative agency tends to support policies permitting it to pre-
sent itself favorably. Regulative bodies restricting such policies are in-
evitably viewed with hostility by the regulated. Indeed, when some
hostility does not exist, the regulators may be assumed to have been
"captured" by the regulated. If the police could, in this sense, 'capture'
the judiciary, the resulting system would truly be suggestive of a
"police state."'
Thus does Jerome Skolnick view the importance of regulating police be-
havior. One police practice that in the eyes of some has "captured" the
judiciary is the "stop and frisk" search of a suspect. The Supreme Court
granted this practice limited legitimacy in Terry v. Ohio.2 This note will
explore the permissible bounds of a frisk, particularly in light of the evi-
dentiary limitation announced recently by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Tinney v. Wilson.'
The fourth amendment to the Constitution was enacted in response to
abusive and unrestrained official searches in colonial America4 when of-
ficers acting under general warrants known as "writs of assistance" had
unlimited power to search for smuggled goods.5 The amendment' divides
conveniently into two sections, one containing the basic safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the other dealing with the require-
ments for issuance of a warrant. The difficulty concerns the proper rela-
tionship between the two sections.7 If a search is conducted under au-
thority of a warrant, can it be unreasonable? And, more importantly, can
J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 229 (1966).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
408 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1969).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969).
D. REISIG, SEARCHES AND SEIzUREs HANDBOOK 58 (1968). For a complete
history of conditions leading up to the adoption of the fourth amendment, see J.
LANDYSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-49 (1966); N.
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-105 (1937); Leagre, The Fourth Amendment
and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 393, 396-98 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Leagre].
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
'For five possible interpretations of how the two sections are related, see
Leagre 398-99.
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a search conducted without a warrant and without probable cause ever
be reasonable?
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not forbid
all searches, but only unreasonable ones.' Originally, the Court defined
a reasonable search as one occurring under authority of a search warrant.'
This requirement has been waived in those exceptional situations where
it is impossible to get a warrant and still make the search, as when deal-
ing with moving vehicles,'" when the police are in hot pursuit," or when
objects are in plain view of an officer making an arrest.12
The Court later developed the principle that when a police officer
makes a valid arrest, a search of the accused and the area under his
immediate control is reasonable.' 3 The search "incident to an arrest"
has come to be one of the most prevalent forms of search.14 Throughout
the development of the incident-search doctrine remained the requirement
that there be probable cause.' 5 Furthermore, the Court continued to
stress the importance of the search warrant by requiring its use whenever
possible. 6
Then, in Camara v. Municipal Court,17 the Court announced that an
8 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). See also Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which held that the fourth and fifth amendments
must be considered together in determining the reasonableness of a search:
For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man
to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned by
the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment,
throws light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 633.
'See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958)."0 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
"1 Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
1 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
1 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). For the historical develop-
ment of the doctrine of searches incident to arrest and its present limitations, see
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
1, Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433,
435 (1969).
"See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) ; Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959). A representative definition of probable cause is:
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within their [the
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-
mation are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
"Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
1 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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investigatory search in a criminal prosecution requires more justification
to be reasonable than a "search" that is merely an administrative in-
spection. No longer would the reasonableness of a search be determined
solely by the presence of probable cause. Instead, the process was in-
verted: The Court first looked to see whether the search had been a
reasonable one; then, having deemed it such, it declared that there was
probable cause for a warrant to be issued. This concept, which some com-
mentators have denominated the "variable probable cause" standard,"
means that the quantum of evidence a police officer needs for probable
cause will vary indirectly with the reasonableness of the search that he
intends to make. The reasonableness of the search is determined by
balancing the government's need for the particular search against the in-
dividual's interest in his privacy. As the degree of police intrusion in-
creases, more probable cause must be shown in justification; stated other-
wise, the greater the intrusion, the less reasonable the search.' 9
The Supreme Court balanced interests recently in Terry v. Ohio20
and held that a police officer with a "reasonable suspicion"'" that an in-
dividual is engaging in criminal activity can stop him for questioning
and, if the policeman reasonably believes that the individual is armed and
presently dangerous, may lawfully "make a carefully limited search of
the suspect's outer clothing for weapons and any weapons found will be
admissible in evidence."22 However, the search must be reasonable not
only at its inception, but throughout.2"
Terry dealt with the on-the-street detention of the suspect and a com-
panion, who had been observed pacing back and forth in front of a store.
The observing police officer believed they were "casing" the store for a
" La Fave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 Micn. L. REv. 40, 55 (1968); Note, 78 YALE L.J., supra note 14,
at 438.
" See Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
- 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court there said, "[T]here is 'no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize)
against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails."' Id. at 21, quoting
from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
"1 Reasonable suspicion is a quantum of evidence less than probable cause.
The difference between probable cause and reasonable grounds to stop a person,
according to Justice Harlan, is that "reasonable grounds to stop do not depend
on any degree of likelihood that a crime has been committed." Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 78 (1968) (concurring opinion).
"Note, Constitutional Law---Search and Seizure-Police nay Conduct Limited
Search for Weapons in Course of Field Investigation Without Probable Cause
for Arrest, 21 VAND. L. Rnv. 1109, 1110 (1968).
"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968).
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robbery and tried to question them. When he received no response, he
frisked them for weapons and found a revolver in Terry's overcoat pocket.
Terry was arrested and convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. The
conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court for the reasons given
above.
Handed down the same day as Terry were Sibron v. New York24
and Peters v. New York,25 two cases in which the Court attempted to
clarify its position. Sibron, while loitering outside a restaurant, was
observed by a police officer to have met and talked with several known
drug addicts. After Sibron entered the restaurant and ate a meal, the
police officer told him to come outside; once there, he said to Sibron,
"You know what I am after." When Sibron mumbled and reached for
his pocket, the officer thrust his hand into the same pocket and discovered
several packets of heroin, which he seized. The Supreme Court ruled
that this evidence must be excluded from trial since the police officer had
neither probable cause for an arrest (thus there could be no incident
search) nor a reasonable suspicion that Sibron was committing a crime
or was armed and dangerous (thus under the principles laid down in
Terry there could be no frisk). The Court made clear in Sibron that
a frisk must be used only for the protection of the officer and not as a
method for gathering evidence when the police have less than probable
cause.
In Peters, police officer Lasky heard a noise at his apartment door
but was unable to investigate because he received a telephone call. After
the call, he looked through a peephole in his door and saw Peters and a
companion tiptoeing out of the alcove toward the stairway. Believing
that the two were attempting a burglary, he dressed, got his revolver, and
gave chase. He caught Peters on the stairs below but was unable to
catch the other man. Peters said that he was visiting a girl friend but
refused to name her. At this point officer Lasky patted Peters down for
weapons and discovered a hard object, which he thought might be a
knife. He removed the object from Peters' pocket and found that it was a
plastic envelope containing burglar tools. The Supreme Court found that
officer Lasky had probable cause to arrest Peters by the time he caught
him on the stairs, and it did not need to apply the Terry frisk rule. The
2 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
"Id. Peters is reported within the Sibron opinion. Hereinafter when Peters
is referred to it will be designated: Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
(Peters).
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burglar tools were properly admitted into evidence since they were seized
lawfully in a search incident to an arrest.
Left unresolved in the Terry trilogy was the scope of intrusion consti-
tutionally permissible in a frisk. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
attempted to provide the answer in Tinney v. Wilson.26 On the night of
April 17, 1965, police officer McGill was approached by a prostitute.
She arranged to engage in an act of prostitution with him at a nearby lo-
cation if a second girl could follow in another car as a lookout. The second
girl got her car and followed them to a parking lot, where, unknown to the
girls, McGill's partner waited. There officer McGill arrested the first
girl for prostitution. The two officers then proceeded to the second car
where they observed Tinney lying on the back seat. The officers asked
Tinney to get out and frisked him for weapons. Officer McGill testified
that he thought that Tinney was in a position to rob him had he driven
into the alley where he and the girl had agreed to go. During the frisk,
officer McGill felt what he thought were pills in Tinney's pocket. He
asked the defendant what they were, and Tinney replied that they were
"nerve pills." Officer McGill advised the defendant of his right to remain
silent and then asked if he had a prescription for the pills. Tinney
answered that he did not. McGill removed the seconal pills from the de-
fendant's pocket, placed him under arrest, handcuffed him, and then made
a more complete search, during which he found a marijuana cigarette.
The trial court admitted the cigarette in evidence, and Tinney was
convicted for possession of marijuana. The California Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction on the theory that his evidence was the result
of a search incident to a lawful arrest. It held that there was probable
cause for the arrest when the police officer felt the pills in Tinney's pocket
and Tinney said that he had no prescription for them.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to adopt the reasoning of
the California courts; and, relying on Terry, ruled the evidence inad-
missible.27 It reasoned that the original frisk of Tinney must be seen as a
limited search based on "reasonable suspicion of the possibility" of
criminal conduct as in Terry, rather than as a search incident to a lawful
arrest, as in Peters. Prior to the removal of the pills from Tinney's poc-
ket, the police knew only that he had some "nerve pills" without a pre-
scription. As there are many such pills that can be purchased without a
" 408 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1969).
" After exhausting his post-conviction remedies in the state courts, Tinney filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. That court
in an unreported opinion denied his petition and Tinney appealed.
1969]
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prescription, the police did not have sufficient knowledge reasonably to
believe that Tinney had committed an offense. Since there was no
probable cause to arrest, there could be no search incident thereto.
Under the Terry doctrine, there is no doubt that the police had the right
to frisk Tinney for weapons, because the officer could reasonably believe
that the defendant had planned to assault him. But a search conducted
without probable cause to arrest must be strictly confined to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover weapons that could be used for an assault
on the police officer. Although the frisk was initially valid, when the
officer felt the pills and pursued his quest of what he knew was not a
weapon, he transgressed the limits of the search permitted by Terry.
28
The search was thus an unconstitutional extension of the frisk, and any
evidence seized thereby could not be admitted at Tinney's trial.20
The court in Tinney could have reached a different conclusion and
decided that all evidence seized during a frisk is admissible at trial.80
Such a holding would have meant the pills in the defendant's pocket were
lawfully seized. The argument then would be that the pills (seconal),
being lawfully seized, provided officer McGill with the probable cause
necessary to arrest Tinney for possession of dangerous drugs; the arrest,
in turn, sanctioned the incident search during which the marijuana
cigarette was discovered. Thus the legality of the search that turned up
the marijuana would depend on the legality of the seizure of the "nerve
pills."
It can be argued that the exclusionary rule forbids only the admission
8 Tinney v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1969).
" "Since Officer McGill's discovery of the pills or capsules in Tinney's pocket
did not follow lawful arrest and resulted from an unconstitutional extension of
his 'frisk" for possible weapons, it follows that any 'fruit' of this search should
have been excluded from Tinney's trial." Id. at 917.
" See, e.g., The Memorandum of the Institute of Government at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on Terry, which was sent to all police depart-
ments in North Carolina:
Again, it must be stressed that the only purpose of a frisk can be for
protection against dangerous weapons. The Court did not answer the ques-
tion, however, of whether the seizure of evidence would be legal if it were
accidentally uncovered while seeking to disarm a suspect whom a frisk
had revealed to be carrying a weapon or if what was thought to be a weapon
turned out instead to be other evidence. The Court probably will permit
the use of such accidentally discovered evidence, although it might not if
it suspects that in many cases the discoveries are not truly "accidental."
Institute of Government, University of North Carolina, Memorandum-Stop and
Frisk Cases, June 14, 1968 (Permanent Institute of Government Library File No.
68.74), at 3.
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of evidence seized in an unreasonable search ;31 if the conditions set forth
by the Supreme Court in Terry are met, then the frisk is reasonable and
any evidence seized should be admissible.32 Justice Harlan advanced this
view in his concurring opinion in Peters v. New York.33 He argued that
the evidence seized during the frisk of Peters should be admitted as the
fruit of a lawful frisk rather than as the fruit of a lawful search incident
to an arrest: "[A]Ithough the frisk is constitutionally permitted only in
order to protect the officer, if it is lawful the State is of course entitled
to the use of any other contraband that appears."3 Dissenting in Sibron
v. New York,"5 Justice Black agreed. Unlike the majority, he concluded
that the police officer there had reasonable cause to believe Sibron armed
and that the frisk was lawful: "Since, therefore, this was a reasonable and
justified search, the use of the heroin discovered by it was admissible in
evidence."36 Justice White's somewhat more limited view of the per-
missible scope of a frisk is that if a police officer, in a "pat down," feels
an object that he believes to be a weapon, he can seize it for admission at
trial even though the object in fact turns out not to be one.
37
Another possible indication of the permissible scope of a frisk is
found in the majority opinion in Sibron. The majority there held the
search illegal only after deciding that there could have been no reasonable
belief that the suspect was engaged in criminal activity or was armed.
Under Terry, absent grounds for such a belief, no frisk of Sibron was
permissible. Arguably, it would have been immaterial for the majority
to have considered whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the
petitioner was armed unless it was prepared to hold admissible all evi-
dence seized as a result of a legal frisk."
The Ninth Circuit did not adopt any of the foregoing arguments in
deciding Tinney. The court acknowledged that a frisk is justified solely
for the protection of the police officer and must be limited to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover only those objects that might be used in
assaulting him. All other objects discovered during a frisk must, there-
8 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule in
Weeks was applied to state action in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 647 (1960)."Note, The Limits of Stop and Frisk-Questions Unanswered by Terry, 10
AnIz. L. REv. 419, 430 (1968); Note, Constitutional Law--Search and Seizure-
"Stop and Frisk," 57 ILL. B.J. 404, 410 (1969).
" Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74-79 (1968) (Peters).
" Id. at 79 (Peters).
" Id. at 79-82 (dissenting opinion).
I01d. at 82.
Id. at 69-70 (Peters) (concurring opinion).
Note, 57 ILL. B.J., supra note 32, at 410-11.
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fore, be seen as the fruits of a search that, though lawful at its inception,
became unreasonably broad in its scope. Since the search becomes un-
reasonably broad at the point where something other than a weapon is
seized, it is unconstitutional; and the evidence must be excluded."0 Thus
in Tinney the "nerve pills" could not be used to show probable cause for
the arrest, and, absent this probable cause, there could be no arrest or
search incident thereto. The marijuana seized from Tinney was therefore
excluded as the result of an unconstitutional search. Much of the lan-
guage in Terry supports this reasoning:
The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment rests on the assumption that
"limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself."
Thus, evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means
of a seizure and search which are not reasonably related in scope to
the justification for their initiation.
40
A search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth
Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope. 41
The Court also stated:
The former [a search incident to an arrest], although justified in part
by acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault
with a concealed weapon is also justified on other grounds and can
therefore involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person. A
search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however,
must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation. Thus it must be limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm
the officer or others nearby, and may be characterized as something
less than a "full" search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.
42
But the Supreme Court in Terry postponed determination of the exact
limits of a frisk: "We need not develop at length in this case, however,
the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective
seizure and search for weapons.
' 4
A hint as to what the Court may ultimately decide these limits to be
Tinney v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1969).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
'Id. at 18.
42 Id. at 25-26 (footnotes omitted).
" Id. at 29.
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can be found in Peters. There the majority seemed to strain to find
probable cause for the arrest. Once this standard was met, the search was
incident to a valid arrest and therefore reasonable. The Court thus
avoided deciding whether evidence other than weapons seized during a
frisk will be admissible as the fruit of a lawful frisk. But if the Court
viewed as admissible evidence other than weapons obtained during a
frisk, surely it would have avoided weakening the probable cause standard
for incident searches44 and would have declared the evidence admissible as
the lawful fruit of a valid frisk.
The Supreme Court's recent decision limiting the physical scope of
searches incident to an arrest also gives strength to the conclusion in
Tinney. In Chimel v. California,45 defendant was arrested in his home
for burglary; the police, although they did not have a search warrant,
then searched his entire house, including the attic, the garage, a small
workshop, and various drawers. They found evidence that was used to
convict him. The Supreme Court reversed,4" holding that since the search
of the defendant's home went far beyond his person and the area from
within which he might have obtained either a weapon or potentially ad-
verse evidence, and that since there was no constitutional justification,
in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that
area, the breadth of the search was unreasonable under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments.
The scope of an incident search was thus made clear by Chimel. There
must be probable cause for the search, and its purpose is not only to pro-
tect the arresting officer but also to seize evidence within the accused's
control. While a frisk may be made upon less than probable cause, its
only justification is to protect the arresting officer; therefore, its scope
should be even more restricted than that of the full-scale search incident
to an arrest. The "variable probable cause" standard requires this re-
sult ;47 since there is less probable cause required for a frisk, the permis-
sible intrusion must be more restrained. As Justice Stewart has said,
"The standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment
"Justice Harlan, concurring in Peters, warned of the possible weakening of the
standard for probable cause. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74-75 (1968)
(Peters).
45395 U.S. 572 (1969).
'8 In reversing Chimel's conviction the Supreme Court overruled Rabinowitz
v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947).
" See p. 113 supra.
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demands that the showing of justification match the degree of in-
trusion. '"48
Just as the Court in Chimel confined incident searches to their original
purpose and justification, so it is proper that frisks be confined in ac-
cordance with their purpose to prevent them from becoming "fishing ex-
peditions" for evidence in circumstances where the police have less than
probable cause for the search. That the police would abuse their privilege
to frisk cannot be doubted. Justice Douglas, speaking on the importance
of a search warrant, stressed this fact: "This right of privacy was deemed
too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection
of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and his-
tory shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.""0
Other commentators have voiced similar misgivings about police use of
the frisk: "[I] t is hard to ignore the fact that here, at least, any power
at all will be abused .... Police will use this power not really to protect
themselves but to seize and confiscate weapons and other contraband."' 0
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice has found that
[i]n some cities, searches are made in a high proportion of instances
not for the purpose of protecting the officer but to obtain drugs or
other incriminating evidence. In New York, for example, where
searches are permitted only when the officer reasonably believes he is
in bodily danger, searches were made in 81.6 percent of stops reported.
However, a Commission survey of police practices in several large
cities, found that [only] one out of every five persons frisked was car-
rying a dangerous weapon .... 51
In Tinney an officer, upon finding the suspect unarmed, nevertheless
continued the frisk to discover evidence. A more difficult situation occurs
when a frisking officer detects what he believes to be a weapon but what
turns out to be other incriminating evidence. The officer has met all the
conditions set down in Terry, but happens to turn up burglar tools in-
4" Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 68-69 (1967). This interpretation is also
that of the court in United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1968) :
"As demonstrated in Terry itself, however, there is a hierarchy of these forms of
interference and the Constitutional standard with which police must comply
varies in relation to the type of arrest they are making." Id. at 618.
" McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
"0 Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police),
58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 433, 461 (1967).
"1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 185 (1967).
[Vol. 48
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stead of a weapon. Here it is difficult to insist that the exclusionary rule
be applied. 2 Nevertheless, it is important that evidence other than
weapons be excluded when discovered in this situation because "there may
be strong incentive for [the police officer] to fabricate grounds for a
frisk since evidence leading to a conviction may be obtained thereby. As a
result, the reliability of the officer's testimony in these cases should be
subject to considerable doubt.""
Police misuse of searches incident to arrests-after Rabinowitg v.
United States4 allowed the police great latitude in making such searches-
became so great that it overshadowed the valid reasons for allowing
warrantless incident searches and led to the limitations enunciated in
Chimel.55 It seems clear that unless the scope of the frisk is limited then
the police will also misuse the frisk procedure. Restricting potential mis-
use by requiring the exclusion of all evidence, other than weapons, dis-
covered during a frisk should have the salutary effect of maximizing
individual freedom from official intrusion without sacrificing the effec-
tiveness of the frisk as a protective device.
J. DAVID JAMES
Criminal Procedure-The Potential Defendant's Right to a
Speedy Trial
In recent years the long quiescent sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial has undergone re-analysis by various federal and state courts.' The
Supreme Court of North Carolina in a recent decision, State v. Johnson,'
"The police find the exclusionary rule particularly repulsive in these circum-
stances. As Professor Skolnick has pointed out, "the impact of the exclusionary
rule, as the police view it, has not been to guarantee greater protection of the
freedom of 'decent citizens' from unreasonable police zeal, but rather to compli-
cate unnecessarily the task of detecting and apprehending criminals." J. Skolnick,
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 227 (1966). Rather than alter his actions in response
to the rule, the policeman often attempts "to infuse the character of legality-
perhaps after the fact-into his actions." Id. 227.
' Comment, Selective Detention and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
158, 170 (1966). "While there are serious objections to barring evidence of crime
discovered in a lawful search, the admissibility of evidence such as betting slips
or narcotics found during a stop may encourage the misuse of the search power."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, supra note 50, at 186.
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
5Note, 78 YALE L.J., supra note 14, at 435-36.
'See gewrally U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Note, Justice Overdue-Speedy Trial
for the Potential Defendant, 5 STAN. L. REv. 95 (1952); Note, The Right to a
Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476 (1968).
2275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274, rev'g 3 N.C. App. 420, 165 S.E.2d 27 (1969).
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